Can psychology continue to uphold the idea of a radical singularity of the subject in a context where the brain is beginning to be described, modeled, and partially measured as a physical system? This question is not merely rhetorical: it points to a growing tension between interpretive traditions and advances in the brain sciences.
From its foundations, psychoanalysis, initiated by Sigmund Freud and later reformulated by Jacques Lacan, has defended the idea that each subject is irrepeatable. Singularity is constructed through history, language, and the unconscious, shaping an experience that escapes any universal formalization.
However, the contemporary development of neuroscience and physical–mathematical models introduces a shift: the brain begins to be understood as a dynamic system, regulated by general principles and susceptible to being studied in terms of energy, information, and prediction.
In this scenario, singularity ceases to be an unquestionable given and becomes a problem.
The free energy principle, developed by Karl Friston, proposes that the brain functions as a system that minimizes uncertainty through predictive processes. Rather than reacting passively, the brain constantly anticipates, corrects, and reorganizes its relationship with the environment.
Karl Friston’s free energy is often written as:
F ≈ −ln p(s)
Where p(s) is the probability of what is perceived. This expression indicates that free energy (F) is related to how improbable (or surprising) a sensory state s is. Here, F measures surprise, prediction error, and system uncertainty. The more unexpected something is, the greater the “free energy.”
If something is highly probable, p(s) is high and −ln p(s) is low.
If something is improbable, p(s) is low and −ln p(s) is high (uncertainty or surprise).
The model implies that mental activity is not arbitrary but responds to structured dynamics. Perception, emotion, and cognition can be interpreted as inferential processes aimed at stabilizing the system.
From this perspective, a key idea emerges: if the brain operates under general principles, then singularity would not be a starting point but a result.
Neuronal activity generates electromagnetic fields that can be recorded using techniques such as EEG or MEG. These tools make it possible to observe dynamic patterns associated with different mental states.
Although these measurements do not directly access subjective content, they do show that each brain presents particular configurations. This is not uniformity, but structured variability.
This enables a relevant hypothesis: singularity could manifest as a specific organization of electromagnetic patterns—that is, as a dynamic signature of the brain system.
In this way, the singular does not disappear, but begins to acquire a partially observable dimension.
Psychoanalysis has maintained that the subject cannot be reduced to data or universal models. Singularity, in this sense, is an epistemological limit.
However, advances in neuroscience introduce a tension that is difficult to ignore. If certain aspects of mental activity can be measured and modeled, to what extent does singularity remain completely inaccessible?
The proposal of David Chalmers is fundamental here. The so-called “hard problem of consciousness” establishes that explaining physical processes is not equivalent to understanding subjective experience.
Therefore, the issue is not resolved by eliminating one perspective in favor of another, but by recognizing a shared limit: measuring is not understanding, but neither does understanding imply ignoring what can be measured.
In this context, nanopsychology emerges as a field that seeks to articulate different levels of analysis. From the molecular and electromagnetic to the symbolic and subjective, it proposes an integrated view of mental functioning.
The development of high-precision sensors, together with artificial intelligence tools, opens the possibility of exploring brain activity with increasing levels of detail. This does not imply reducing subjectivity to data, but situating it within a broader framework. Singularity, from this perspective, can be understood as an emergent property: a unique configuration resulting from the interaction between physical, chemical, biological, and symbolic processes.
The initial question can be reformulated: is psychology in doubt, or are its fundamental concepts undergoing transformation?
The intersection of free energy, electromagnetic fields, and computational models does not invalidate the psychological tradition, but it does challenge it. The singularity of the subject ceases to be an unquestionable absolute and becomes an open problem.
This implies an epistemological shift:
• from the ineffable to the emergent
• from the inaccessible to the partially modelable
• from the exclusively symbolic to the dynamic
In this sense, psychology does not disappear, but is compelled to redefine its categories. The singularity of the subject is not dissolved by advances in neuroscience or physical models of the brain. However, neither does it remain intact.
Between the irrepeatable and the measurable, a new way of thinking about subjectivity emerges: not as an absolute mystery, but as a complex organization that articulates multiple levels.
Nanopsychology does not solve the problem of singularity, but it redefines it. And in that redefinition, psychology does not lose its object, but rediscovers it within a broader horizon, where the symbolic, the biological, and the energetic converge. Doubt, then, does not weaken psychology—it compels it to evolve.
Indicative bibliography
1. Karl Friston (2010). The free-energy principle: a
unified brain theory? Nature
Reviews Neuroscience.
2. McFadden, Johnjoe (2020). Integrating information in the brain’s EM field: the cemi field theory
of consciousness. Neuroscience
of Consciousness, 2020, 1, niaa016.
3. Tamlyn, Hunt (2024) Consciousness Might Hide in Our Brain’s Electric Fields. Scientific American. Vol. 34 No. 3s , p. 22.
4. D’Andrea, Alberto L.(2025) El
secreto electromagnético de la consciencia.Biotecnología & Nanotecnología al Instante: https://infobiotecnologia.blogspot.com/2025/06/consciencia- oculta-en-los-campos.html
5. David
Chalmers (1996). The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.
6. D’Andrea,
Alberto L. (2026). Nanopsicología. La
psicología del siglo XXI. Editorial Autores Argentinos. Argentina.
